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ARGUMENT I 
THIS COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO UTAH 
CODE ANN. §23-19-9.1 BECAUSE THE DIVISION OF WILDLIFE SERVICES IS 
REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH ALL COURT ORDERS IRREGARDLESS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS. 
The State argues that Greg C. Johnson ("Johnson") and Kerry E. Lynn 
("Lynn") did not exhaust their available administrative remedies and as such this 
Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal. However, the 
State's argument is incorrect. 
First, both Johnson and Lynn have in place a Order Granting 402 Motion 
("January 25, 2005 Orders") entered by the Sixth District Court on or about 
January 25, 2005 which specifically states that their "hunting privileges are 
suspended until April 22, 2007 which is five years from the date of conviction. [R. 
at 49-50, 275-276 and Pleading Copies at Addendum 3 and 4 of Appellant's 
Brief]. On July 17, 2008, Judge Wallace Lee issued a Memorandum Decision 
and Order in both the Johnson and Lynn cases and held that "25 January 2005 
Order of this Court did not direct the Division to do anything. Thus Section 23-19-
9.1 does not apply." [R. at 126-129, 267-270 and Pleading Copies at Addendum 
5 and 6 of Appellant's Brief]. 
Utah Code Ann. §23-19-9.1 mandates that the Division "withhold, suspend, 
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restrict, or reinstate the use of license if ordered by a court. [See Statute Copy at 
Addendum 1 of Appellant's Brief]. The plain language of Utah Code Ann. §23-
19-9.1 requires the Division to comply with all Court orders. There simply is no 
requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted prior to entry of any court 
ordered suspension or reinstatement of hunting privileges. 
In contrast, if this appeal was based upon the Division wrongfully 
suspending Johnson and Lynn's hunting privileges, then Johnson and Lynn 
would be required to "exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a 
prerequisite to seeking judicial review." State Tax Comm'n v. Iverson. 782 P.2d 
519, 524 (Utah 1989). However, since Johnson and Lynn are arguing that the 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. §23-19-9.1 requires that the Division reinstate 
their hunting privileges, the requirement that they pursue administrative remedies 
is not applicable since Utah Code Ann. §23-19.-9.1 requires that the Division 
comply with all court orders if so ordered by a court irregardless of administrative 
hearings. 
Furthermore, even if this Court believes that Johnson and Lynn should 
have exhausted all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, there 
are exceptions to this general requirement. As outlined in the State's Brief, in 
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unusual situations "where it appears that exhaustion would service no useful 
purpose" then the "law does not require litigants to do a futile or vain act" of 
exhausting all administrative remedies. [State's Brief at p. 7, citing Holladay 
Towne Ctr. v. Holladay. 192 P.3d 302, 304 (Utah 2008)(citations omitted)]. 
In this matter, on April 22, 2002 when Johnson and Lynn plead guilty to 
Wanton Destruction of a Trophy Deer, they were aware that pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §23-9-9, that the Division would be pursuing an administrative 
suspension of their hunting privileges. Johnson and Lynn were subsequently 
given notice that the Division would be suspending their hunting privileges. Even 
though they were given notice of their right to an administrative hearing, they did 
not respond to the Division's action to suspend their hunting privileges because 
of their agreement with the Prosecutor, Marvin Bagley, that upon successful 
completion of their probation that their hunting privileges would only be 
suspended for five years from date of conviction rather than the term of the 
impending longer Division suspensions. [R. at 274 P.5 Ls 20-25, and 274 P.5 Ls 
8-13]. 
Utah Code Ann. §23-19-9 is very specific as to when and for how long 
hunting privileges will be suspended for listed violations. In this case, the Division 
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followed the mandatory provisions of Utah Code Ann. §23-19-9 and suspended 
Johnson and Lynn's hunting privileges pursuant to statute. [R. at 67 fl9, 91-93, 
193H9,217-219]. 
Johnson and Lynn could have requested a hearing, but irregardless of 
what Johnson and Lynn would have presented as evidence or justification to 
shorter suspension terms, the Division would have still entered the same 
suspensions because Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9 mandates when and how 
suspensions are to be handled. Additionally, even if Johnson and Lynn would 
have requested an administrative hearing and testified that they had a deal with 
the Prosecutor that provided that in more than two years in the future, the Sixth 
District Court would be entering an order trumping any Division suspension, it 
would have served no useful purpose to exhaust their administrative remedies. 
The Division would have given little or any credibility to their arguments since it 
would be uncertain as to whether the Sixth District Court would enter such an 
order, and if an order was entered it would be more than two years in the future. 
Therefore, almost to a certainty, the Division would have entered the same 
suspension orders irregardless of all defenses and evidence that could have 
been presented by Johnson and Lynn about some future event more than two 
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years in the future. Consequently, it is clear that this matter falls under the 
exception cited in Holladay Towne Ctr. since it would have served no useful 
purpose for Johnson and Lynn to exhaust all administrative remedies. 
Therefore, as outlined herein, this Court clearly has subject matter 
jurisdiction and this appeal should not be dismissed because of lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD 
THAT THE January 25, 2005 COURT ORDERS DID NOT DIRECT THE 
DIVISION TO DO ANYTHING AND THAT UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-9.1 DID 
NOT APPLY. 
The State argues in its brief that Johnson and Lynn have failed to 
demonstrate that Judge Lee's decision was a clear abuse of discretion. State's 
Brief at P.7]. This argument is incorrect. In Appellant's Brief, Johnson and Lynn, 
cite applicable case law which provides that unless there is a clear abuse of 
discretion, a court's interpretation of its own order will typically not be reversed. 
[See Appellant's Brief at P. 16 and Uintah Basin v. Hardy. 179 P.3d 786 (Utah 
2008) and Enodis Corp. v. Employers Inc. of Wausau (In. Re Consol. Indus. 
Corp.). 360 F3d 712 (7m Cir. 2004). 
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Appellant's Brief clearly details exactly how Judge Lee abused his 
discretion in holding that the January 25, 2005 Orders created a separate judicial 
suspension rather than trumping the existing Division suspension orders. In 
Judge Lee's analysis of the Johnson and Lynn's cases, he incorrectly states that 
the August, 2002 Division suspensions and the January 25, 2005 Orders were 
entered at or about the same time." [ R. at 126-129, 267-270, and Pleading 
Copies at Addendum 5 and 6 of Appellant's Brief]. The January 25, 2005 Orders 
were entered nearly two and one-half years after the Division suspensions. 
Additionally, as outlined in Appellant's Brief, the facts surrounding the issuance of 
the January 25, 2005 Orders clearly demonstrates that it was the intent of 
Johnson, Lynn, Prosecutor and the District Court to "reinstate" hunting privileges 
as of April 22, 2007. [Appellant's Brief at p. 20-22]. To hold otherwise makes no 
sense. Why would the District Court enter the January 25, 2005 Orders 
suspending hunting privileges until April 22, 2007 if it were not the intention that 
Johnson and Lynn's hunting privileges were to be reinstated on April 22, 2007? 
Furthermore, the State argues that there is statutory authority to create 
both administrative and judicial suspensions and, therefore, it was appropriate for 
Judge Lee to interpret that the Johnson and Lynn Court Orders were to run 
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consecutively with the Division Default Orders of longer duration. 
It is true that Utah Code Ann. §23-19-9 provides for both judicial and 
administrative suspensions. However, the State incorrectly argues that because 
there is nothing in Utah Code Ann. §23-19-9 that prohibits both a judicial and 
administrative suspension be imposed for the same conviction, that there was no 
abuse of discretion for Judge Lee to hold the two competing orders were to run 
consecutively. 
However, as argued in Appellant's Brief, the plain language of Utah Code 
Ann. §23-19-9(6)(c) "specifically provides that if the Division suspends hunting 
privileges that have been previously suspended by a court, the suspensions 
may run consecutively. [Appellant's Brief at p. 20]. However, in interpreting the 
plain language of the statute, it only provides for consecutive suspensions, if the 
court ordered suspension is entered and then a Division order is entered." 
However, in this matter, there was a Division Order and almost two and one-half 
years later a Court Order was entered with the clear intent that Johnson and 
Lynn's hunting privileges were to be reinstated as of April 22, 2007. 
As outlined herein, Judge Lee's interpretation of the Court Order's is a 
"clear abuse of discretion" because he incorrectly cited critical facts which lead to 
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the wrong conclusion and he ignored the "plain language" of Utah Code Ann §23-
19-9(6)(c) which only provides for consecutive suspensions when there is first a 
judicial suspension and then a division suspension. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal and the Court should reverse the Memorandum Decision of the Trial 
Court and order that the Division of Wildlife Resources immediately reinstate all 
hunting privileges of Gregg C. Johnson and Kerry E. Lynn. 
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